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KONOP v. HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. 
2001 U.S. APP. LEXIS 191. (9TH CIR. JAN 8, 
2001) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc.,l the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the unautho-
rized access of the content of a secure website is a violation of 
the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act.2 This is 
the first case to determine whether unauthorized accessing of 
a secure private website is a violation of the Wiretap Act.3 
This decision is contrary to an earlier decision by the Fifth 
Circuit in United. States v. Turk, 4 which held that the Wiretap 
Act required contemporaneous transmission and acquisition of 
the communication.5 
1 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191 (9th Cir. Jan 8, 
2001). The appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California was argued and submitted on June 8, 2000 before Circuit Judges Robert 
Boochever, Steven Reinhart, and Richard A. Daez. The decision was filed on January 
8, 2001. Boochever authored the opinion. 
2 See id. at *25. 
3 See id. at *7. 
4 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976). 
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that the scope of protection 
under the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act 
depends on the degree of intrusion, not on whether the com-
munication is in transit or storage.6 Subsequently, content on 
a secure website is an "electronic communication" within the 
meaning of the Acts and is therefore protected from unlawful 
interception.7 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that defend-
ant's unlawful interception of the content on plaintiff's secure 
website, followed by its disclosure to an opposing union fac-
tion and engagement in coercion and intimidation, raised a 
triable issue of fact, and remanded Konop's claims under the 
Railway labor Act.8 
II. FACTS 
Robert Konop ("Konop"), a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines, 
Inc. ("Hawaiian"), established a website on which he posted 
bulletins criticizing Hawaiian, its officers, and the Air Line 
Pilots Association ("ALPA") for negotiating labor concessions.9 
Konop encouraged other pilots to consider alternate union 
representation because ALPA supported a proposal by Hawai-
ian for wage concessions. lo Access to Konop's website was lim-
ited to certain Hawaiian employees who were required to log 
on with a user name and password provided by Konop.ll 
Before issuing a password to potential viewers, Konop also re-
quired each viewer to agree not to disclose the contents of Ko-
nop's website. 12 
In December 1995, James Davis, Vice-President of Hawai-
ian ("Davis") approached a Hawaiian pilot, Gene Wong 
("Wong"), seeking permission to use Wong's name to access 
Konop's website. 13 With Wong's permission Davis used Wong's 
6 See id. at *12. 
7 See id. at *25. 
8 See id. at *42-43. 
9 See id.· at *2. 
10 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *30. 
11 See id. at *3. Hawaiian managers and union representatives were denied ac-
cess to Konop's website. See id. 
12 See id. Before obtaining a password, potential users of Konop's website were 
required to click a button which indicated agreement to the terms of use, which in-
cluded a non-disclosure clause. See id. 
13 See id. 
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name to log on and view Konop's website.14 Consequently, 
when Davis logged onto Konop's website he indicated that he 
agreed to the website's terms and conditions.15 
Shortly thereafter, Konop received a call from Reno 
Morella ("Morella"), the union chairman of ALPA, regarding 
the contents of Konop's website. 16 Morella informed Konop 
that Bruce Nobles ("Nobles"), president of Hawaiian, had 
called him because he was distressed by the contents of Ko-
nop's websiteY Based on his conversation with Morella, Ko-
nop believed that Nobles had obtained access to his website 
and was now threatening to sue Konop for defamation.18 
As a result, Konop took his website down for the rest of 
the day.19 However, he restored the website the next day, still 
uncertain of how Nobles had acquired access to his website.20 
After examining his access logs, Konop learned that Davis 
had logged on as Wong.21 Meanwhile, Davis had obtained per-
mission from another pilot, James Gardner ("Gardner"), to log 
on using his name.22 From December 1995 through April 1, 
1996, Konop records indicated over twenty log-ins by Davis, 
as Wong, and at least fourteen more as Gardner.23 
III. PROCEDURE 
Konop filed suit against Hawaiian at the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California, alleging 
violation of the Railway Labor Act,24 the Wiretap Act,25 and 
14 See id. at*3. Wong had never used the site, and had never agreed to Konop's 
terms of use or the terms of Konop's non-disclosure agreement. See id. 
15 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *3. The Ninth Circuit presumed that 
Davis indicated consent to Konop's terms of use for the website by clicking a button. 
See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. According to Morella, Nobles was upset by Konop's allegations of fraud, 
and by other criticisms contained in Konop's website. See id. 
18 See id. at *4. 
19 See id. 
20 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *4. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. at *4. 
24 See 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (2000). 
25 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000). 
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the Stored Communications Act;26 all of which arose from Da-
vis' viewing of Konop's website.27 In addition, Konop brought 
claims against Hawaiian based on his allegation that Hawai-
ian imposed a medical coverage suspension in retaliation to 
his opposition to proposed labor concessions.28 The district 
court granted summary judgment to Hawaiian on all but the 
last claim.29 However, after a short bench trial, the district 
court entered judgment against Konop for his claim of retalia-
tory suspension.30 
Subsequently, Konop appealed the summary judgment 
and the judgment entered against him on his retaliatory sus-
pension claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.31 Konop argued that Davis accessed his website 
under false pretenses and thus violated both the Wiretap Act 
and the Stored Communications Act.32 In addition, Konop ar-
gued that Hawaiian violated the Railway Labor Act by its un-
authorized access to and disclosure of the content on his web-
site.33 On January 8, 2001, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded the district court's summary judgment concerning 
Konop's claims under the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communi-
cations Act, and the Railway Labor Act.34 However, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court's summary judgment against 
Konop on his claim of retaliatory suspension.35 
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
A. WIRETAP ACT AND STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CLAIMS 
Protection against eavesdropping through modern elec-
tronic communications is governed by the Wiretap Act and 
the Stored Communications Act.36 The Wiretap Act prohibits 
26 See id. §§ 2701-2710. 
27 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *4. Konop also alleged numerous state 
law tort claims. See id. 
26 See id. 
29 See id. at *5. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at *1. 
32 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *5. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at *2. 
35 See id. 
38 See id. at *6. 
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unauthorized "interception" of "electronic communications."37 
The Stored Communications Act prohibits unauthorized "ac-
cess" to a "facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided."38 Since the civil damages differ substan-
tially between the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communica-
tions Act,39 the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether Davis' 
use of Konop's website under false pretenses was an unautho-
rized interception, or access, or both.40 This issue was one of 
first impression for the Ninth CircuitY 
1. Interpretation of the Wiretap Act 
First, the Ninth Circuit focused on the Wiretap Act's defi-
nition of interception.42 In its original form, the Wiretap Act 
prohibited any person from "willfully intercept[ing], en-
deavor[ing] to intercept, or procur[ing] any other person to in-
tercept, any wire or oral communication . . . ."43 The Wiretap 
Act defined "wire communication" as "any communication 
made ... through the use of facilities for the transmission of 
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connec-
tion."44 An "oral communication" was "any oral communication 
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such com-
munication is not subject to interception .... "45 "Intercept" 
meant "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or 
oral communication through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device."46 
In an earlier Fifth Circuit case, United States u. Turk,47 
the term "intercept" had received a narrow construction.48 In 
Turk, the Fifth Circuit determined whether an interception of 
37 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511). 
38 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701). 
39 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2250 with 18 U.S.C. § 2707. Civil penalties are greater 
under the Wiretap Act than under the Stored Communications Act. See Konop, 2001 
U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *6. 
40 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *6-7. 
41 See id. at *7. 
42 See id. 
43 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(a) (West 1970) (amended 1986). 
44 [d. § 2510 (1). 
45 [d. § 2510 (2). 
46 [d. § 2510 (4). 
47 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976). 
48 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *8. 
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a communication included playing back a tape-recorded con-
versation which had been recorded by a third party.49 The 
Fifth Circuit held that it did not and that no interception had 
occurred, because the logic and policy of the Wiretap Act re-
quired contemporaneous transmission and acquisition of the 
communication. 50 
Whether an interception requires transmission and acqui-
sition to be contemporaneous was vital to analyzing Konop's 
claim.51 Under the original Wiretap Act, as interpreted by 
Turk, there could never be an "interception" from the 
downloading of the information stored on web servers. 52 
2. Scope of Protection Under the Wiretap Act and the Stored 
Communications Act 
To determine whether Turk's contemporaneity require-
ment was persuasive dicta, the Ninth Circuit discussed the 
subsequent amendments to the Wiretap Act by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").53 Title I of the ECPA 
amended the Wiretap Act by prohibiting unauthorized "inter-
ception" of "electronic communications."54 Title II of the ECPA 
created the Stored Communications Act, prohibiting unautho-
rized "access" to "a facility through which an electronic com-
munication service is provided."55 
Of importance was the expansion of the definition of 
"wired communication."56 The definition was expanded to in-
clude "any electronic storage of such communication."57 Addi-
tionally, the amended ECPA created exceptions to the catch-
all category of "electronic communication."58 These included 
"any transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical 
4. See Turk, 526 F.2d at 658. 
50 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *8. 
51 See id. at *9. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 18 U.S.C.§ 2511. 
55 Id. at § 2701. 
56 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *10. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
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system. "59 
The Ninth Circuit then determined whether the amended 
definition of "intercept" under the Wiretap Act squared with 
weaker protection afforded under the Stored Communications 
Act.60 The Ninth Circuit referred to its holding in United 
States v. Smith,61 where the issue was whether stored commu-
nications were protected under the Wiretap Act.62 
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's 
definition of "intercept" in Turk because it was difficult to 
"square" with the Wiretap Act's new definition of "wire com-
munications."63 The amended definition included "stored com-
munications," which rendered the Turk requirement of con-
temporaneity meaningless.64 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the term "intercept" under the Wiretap Act 
and "access" under the Stored Communications Act must be 
conceptually and qualitatively different.65 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit explained that intercept 
means acquiring the contents of a communication, while ac-
cess merely involves being in a position to acquire the con-
tents of a communication.66 Hence, the scope of protection 
under the Acts depends on the degree of intrusion, not on 
whether the communication is in transit or storage.67 Apply-
ing Smith's definition of "interception" to electronic communi-
cation would render the unauthorized acquisition of the con-
tents of a secure website an interception, and as such a 
violation of the Wiretap Act.68 
59 [d. 
60 See id. 
61 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1988). 
62 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *10. 
63 See id. at *11. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at *12. The Fifth Circuit's definition of interception required contempo-
raneous transmission and acquisition of a wire communication. See Turk, 526 F.2d at 
658. 
66 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *12. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at *12-13. In Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service, the 
Fifth Circuit, the only court to have decided this issue, concluded that Congress in-
tended the ECPA to carry forward Turk's requirement of contemporaneity. See id. (cit-
ing Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Servo 26 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 
1994)). Therefore, an unauthorized acquisition of another person's secure website con-
tent would not be an "interception" because the content acquired was a "stored com-
7
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3. Acquisition Need Not Be Contemporaneous With 
Transmission 
The Ninth Circuit then analyzed whether "intercept" has 
the same meaning when applied to either wire or electronic 
communications.69 The Ninth Circuit first noted that the 
Wiretap Act provides only one definition of "intercept," and 
that definition does not expressly include Turk's requirement 
of contemporaneity.70 In addition, the Turk contemporaneity 
requirement is not included in the ECPA's legislative history, 
nor has it been widely adopted by other circuit courts.71 
Therefore, Congress did not intend to require Turk's "contem-
poraneity" requirement into its amended definition of 
intercept. 72 
4. Exceptions 
Under the Wiretap Act, not all viewing of a website con-
stitutes in an unlawful interception.73 For example, accessing 
an electronic communication readily available to the general 
munication." See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *13. In reaching its decision, 
the Fifth Circuit had relied on the exclusion of "stored communication" within the 
definition of protected "electronic communications." See id. However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was not persuaded by the Fifth Circuit that Congress intended to have one defi-
nition of "intercept" govern "wire communications," while another definition of "inter-
cept" governed "electronic communications." See id. Although the definition of 
"electronic communications" does not expressly include stored communications, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that protection was implied because electronic communica-
tion cannot be successfully completed otherwise. See id. at *15 (citing Tatsuya 
Akamine, Proposal for a Fair Statutory Interpretation: Email Stored in a Secure Pro-
vider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. & 
Pol'y, 550-51 (1999». 
69 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *12-13. 
70 "Intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device. See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14. (citing 18 US.C. § 
2510(4». 
71 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14. The Ninth Circuit found only one 
apparent adoption the Turk definition of "intercept" by a circuit court prior to the 
passing of the ECPA. See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14 (noting United 
States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1156 (11thCir. 1982». 
72 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14. 
73 See id. at *20. 
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public is not a violation.74 Additionally, obtaining appropriate 
consent does not constitute a violation. 75 
The Ninth Circuit readily discounted the classification of 
Konop's website as being available to the general public.76 Ko-
nop required user names and passwords to restrict access to 
his website.77 Therefore, absent consent, Davis' access of Ko-
nop's website was a violation of the Wiretap Act. 78 
The Ninth Circuit then determined whether Davis had 
obtained consent to access Konop's website.79 The Wiretap Act 
provides that consent must be given by "one of the parties to 
the communication."80 A party to a communication is defined 
as "a person or group participating in an action or affair."81 
Hawaiian claimed that Wong's consent, as an authorized 
user of Konop's website, entitled Davis to view the contents of 
the website.82 However, only pilots who identified themselves, 
created passwords, and agreed to the website's terms in re-
turn for access to the Konop website were parties to an agree-
ment with Konop.83 Wong did not identify himself, create a 
password, or agree to the website's terms, and therefore was 
not party to an agreement with Konop.84 As Konop never gave 
Wong permission to use the website, Wong could not have 
given Davis his consent.85 
Hawaiian argued that Konop gave implied consent to Da-
vis by failing to disable Wong and Gardner's access to the 
74 "It shall not unlawful. .. for any person ... to intercept or access an electronic 
communication made through an electronic communication system that is so con-
figured that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general pub-
lic." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). 
75 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *21. 
76 See id. at *20-21. 
77 See id. at *21. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at *21-25. 
60 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(d). 
81 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *21-22 (citing Merman Webster's Col-
legiate Dictionary 1322 <Delux ed. 1987)). 
82 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *21. In the alternative, Hawaiian 
claimed that Davis later received consent from Gardner. See id. at *23. Nevertheless, 
Gardner's consent did not give Davis prior consent that could excuse Davis' previous 
access of the website as "Wong." See id. 
83 See id. at *23. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at *23. 
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website after discovering Davis' conduct.86 In United States u. 
Van Poyck,87 the Ninth Circuit held that consent "may be 'im-
plied in fact' from surrounding circumstances indicating that 
the [party] knowingly agreed to the surveillance."88 While Ko-
nop suspected that Hawaiian management had accessed his 
website, he did not know how or by whom until months 
later.89 The Ninth Circuit determined that because these facts 
were open to interpretation, this issue should have been de-
cided by the finder of fact and not on summary judgment.90 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that any implied 
consent Davis might have received had not been given prior 
to Davis' first visit to Konop'S website.91 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that information 
contained on secure web sites is an "electronic communication" 
which is protected from "unauthorized interception under the 
Wiretap Act."92 Further, Konop had successfully raised mate-
rial issues of fact concerning whether Davis had consent to 
view Konop's website, and whether Davis had violated the 
Stored Communications Act by acquiring unauthorized ac-
cess.93 Therefore, the district court had erred in granting sum-
mary judgment for Hawaiian on Konop's claims under the 
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act.94 
86 See id. at *24-25. 
87 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996). 
88 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *24 (quoting Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 
292). The Ninth Circuit also considered a broader definition of "parties to a communi-
cation" which included intended, as well as actual, recipients of the communication. 
See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191 at *22. However, the additional steps required 
to gain access to Konop's website indicate that not all Hawaiian pilots were intended 
parties. See id. at *23. As Wong never took these steps, he was merely a potential re-
cipient and thus not an intended recipient of Konop's website content. See id. at *22-
23. 
89 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *24-25. 
90 See id. at *25. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *25. 
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B. RAILWAY LABOR ACT CLAIM 
The second issue the Ninth Circuit considered was 
whether Hawaiian had violated the Railway Labor Act 
("RLA").95 The RLA prohibits "interference, influence, or coer-
cion by either party over the designation or representatives by 
the other."96 The RLA also prohibits any carrier from interfer-
ing in any way with the organization of its employees.97 Ko-
nop claimed Hawaiian violated the RLA by (1) interfering 
with Konop's organizing efforts through Davis' unauthorized 
access of Konop's website, (2) wrongfully assisting the ALPA 
by disclosing the contents of his website, and (3) engaging in 
coercion and intimidation by threatening to file suit against 
Konop based on the content of his website.98 Before analyzing 
Konop's allegations, the Ninth Circuit determined whether 
the district court had erred in dismissing Konop's RLA claims 
on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims.99 
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over RLA 
disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements 
("CBA") which are considered "minor" claims which must be 
brought to ,arbitration. lOo However, claims that arise under 
statutory provisions are not "minor" claims, and may be 
brought directly in district court.lOl The Ninth Circuit deter-
95 See id. at *26. 
96 45 US.C. § 152. 
97 See id. 
98 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *26. 
99 See id. at *27. 
100 See id. at *27. The RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for "the 
prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes, major and minor. See 45 
US.C. §151(a). Major disputes are those concerning rates of pay and rules or work-
ing, and they relate to 'the formation of, or attempt to secure, collective bargaining 
agreements. See Conrail u. Railway Labor Executiues Ass'n, 491 US. 299, 302 (1989) 
quoting Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. u. Burley, 325 US. 711, 723 (1945». "Minor" disputes, 
"grow out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements cov-
ering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 US.C. §151(a). Minor disputes in-
volve "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement 
in a particular fact situation." See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. u. Norris, 512 US. 246, 
252-53, 256 (1994). 
101 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *28. (citing Fennessy u. Southwest 
Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1996». 
11
DeFonte: Technology
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
318 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
mined that "Konop had presented specific statutory claims 
based on violations of the RLA."1D2 Konop's RLA claims were 
not subject to arbitration, and hence are within the court's 
jurisdiction. 103 
2. Protected Activity 
Once the issue 'of jurisdiction had been resolved, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed Hawaiian's argument that it had not 
interfered with any protected organizing activity.l04 It con-
tended that Konop posted articles which seriously criticized 
Hawaiian's managers and their wage concession proposals on 
his website. l05 These articles also suggested an alternative 
union representation to the current ALPA representation.106 
Labor organizing activity in publications loses protection if 
the publication contains defamatory statements.107 
Hawaiian claimed that Konop's statements were defama-
tory and known to be false. lOB The Ninth Circuit scrutinized 
each of the alleged defamatory statements to determine 
whether the publications were defamatory or false or whether 
they were protected under the RLA.109 As to the first and sec-
ond statements, the Ninth Circuit classified them as rhetori-
102 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *29. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. at *30. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *31 (citing Linn u. United Plant 
Guard Workers of Amer., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966». Employers covered under 
the RLA are not subject to the provisions of the NLRA. See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. 
Lexis 191, at *31. However, courts look to the NLRA and the cases interpreting it for 
guidance in interpreting the RLA. See Brotherhood of Ry. 'Trainmen u. Jacksonuille 
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969). The Ninth Circuit saw no reason not to apply 
the rule regarding protected activities announced in Linn in the context of the RLA. 
See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *31. 
108 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *32. The allegedly defamatory state-
ments included: (1) "Nobles does his 'dirty work ... like the Nazis during World War 
II,' " (2) "Soviet Negotiating Style Essential to Nobles Plan!," (3) "Nobles is 'one in-
competent at the top,' " (4) "Nobles 'has very little skill and little ability with people . 
. . In fact, with as few skills as Nobles possesses, it is difficult to imagine how he got 
this far,' " and (5) "Nobles Suspected in Fraud!" and "Hawaiian Air president, Bruce 
Nobles, is the prime suspect in an alleged fraud which took place in 1991." See id. at 
*32. 
109 See id. at *32-35. 
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cal hyperbole, which is protected under federal labor law. l1° 
The third and fourth statements were classified as opinions, 
which are also protected under federal law.111 As to the last 
statement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hawaiian did not 
show that Konop published it with knowledge of falsity.1l2 Ab-
sent a showing of malice, the Ninth Circuit determined that 
Konop's publications were protected under the RLA.113 
3. Specific Violations 
After establishing that Konop's activities may constitute 
protected organizing activity under the RLA, the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed Konop's RLA claims.114 Konop alleged that Ha-
waiian had violated his rights under the RLA by (1) interfer-
ing with his organizing efforts through its unauthorized 
access of his website, (2) wrongfully supporting one labor 
group in favor of another by informing the ALPA of his web-
site's content, and (3) engaging in coercion and intimidation 
by threatening to sue him for defamation.115 Hawaiian argued 
that Konop lacked sufficient evidence of these violations. 116 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.117 
a. Access of website 
Without legitimate justification, employers are prohibited 
from engaging in surveillance of union organizing activities. 118 
110 See id. at *32. 
111 See id. at *32-33. 
112 See id. at *34. 
113 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *34. 
114 See id. at *35. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36. Section 8(a)(1) of the National 
Labor Relations Act states that it is unfair labor practice for an employer "to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). In California Acrylic Industries v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 
1095 (9th Cir. 1998) the Ninth Circuit explained that eavesdropping is generally pro-
hibited because it has a tendency to "create fear among employees of future reprisals" 
and it is this tendency, and not the actual chilling of protected activities, that there-
fore "chills an employee's freedom to exercise" rights under federal labor law. See Cal· 
ifornia, 150 F.3d at 1099. 
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Furthermore, labor law prohibits eavesdropping on a conver-
sation between an employee and a union tepresentative. 119 
Finding no distinction between eavesdropping on a conversa-
tion and the unauthorized viewing of an employee's secure 
website, the Ninth Circuit determined that Konop had "raised 
a material issue of triable fact" regarding Hawaiian's interfer-
ence with Konop's union organizing activity.120 
b. Disclosure to opposing union 
Konop's second RLA claims alleged that Hawaiian had 
improperly assisted an opposing labor faction by disclosing 
the contents of Konop's website to Morella, the chairman of 
ALPA.121 Under the RLA, an employer is prohibited from as-
sisting one union faction over another.122 Although Hawaiian 
argued that Konop had failed to present sufficient evidence 
that Nobles had made such a disclosure or was even familiar 
with the contents of Konop's website, the Ninth Circuit found 
otherwise. 123 
First, Morella stated that Nobles had contacted him re-
garding the contents of Konop's website.124 Second, Noble con-
firmed that he had contacted Morella concerning the effects 
that Konop's "inaccurate attacks on the proposed labor agree-
ments" would have on the ratification.125 As such, Nobles had 
effectively conceded that he contacted Morella to help ensure 
119 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36 (citing National Labor Relations 
Board v. Unbelievable Inc., 71 F.3d 1434, 1435-39 (9th Cir. 1995) (in which the Ninth 
Circuit found that an employer had violated the National Labor Relations Act by en-
gaging in the unfair labor practices of eavesdropping on private conversations be-
tween employees and a union representative). 
120 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36. The Ninth Circuit also rejected 
Hawaiian's claim that its surveillance of Konop's website to correct false or mislead-
ing statements were justified under the RLA, the Wiretap Act, or the Stored Commu-
nications Act. See id. at *37. Nor did the Ninth Circuit accept Hawaiian's claim that 
Davis' access to Konop's website did not violate the RLA because Konop did not ap-
preciably limit his activities. See id. The Ninth Circuit found no authority to support 
such a requirement. See id. 
121 See id. at *38. 
122 See id. at *39 (citing Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n., 897 F.2d 999, 1009 
(9th Cir. 1990». 
123 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *39-4l. 
124 See id. at *39-40. 
125 See id. at *40. 
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that ALPA would prevail over Konop's opposing faction. 126 The 
Ninth Circuit held that under these facts, Konop presented a 
triable issue of fact on the issue of whether Hawaiian violated 
the RLA by improperly providing assistance to ALPA.127 
c. Threat of defamation suit 
Konop's third RLA claim alleged that Nobles had engaged 
in unlawful coercion and intimidation by threatening to sue 
him for defamation.128 An employer violates the RLA by filing 
or threatening to file a lawsuit against an employee concern-
ing union organizing activities. 129 Hawaiian argued that Ko-
nop failed to present sufficient evidence that Nobles had ever 
threatened Konop with a lawsuit.130 However, Morella had 
stated, in his declaration, that Nobles advised him to caution 
or inform Konop of the possibility of a defamation suit.13l 
Morella relayed Nobles' warning to Konop.132 Based on these 
facts, the Ninth Circuit found that Konop had raised a triable 
issue of fact that Nobles violated the RLA by engaging in co-
ercion and intimidation by threatening Konop with a defama-
tion suit.133 
4. Conclusion 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had 
erred in granting summary judgment against Konop for his 
RLA claims.134 The Ninth Circuit determined that the court 
had jurisdiction over the claims.135 Furthermore, Konop had 
raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether Konop's or-
126 See id. 
127 See id. at *40-41. 
128 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *41. 
129 See id. (citing Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding employer's defamation lawsuit against union violated 29 
U.S.C. §159(a)(1»; Also citing GHR Energy Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 
1991) (analyzing whether employer's threat to sue employee for defamation violated 
NLRA». See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *41. 
130 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *41. 
131 See id. at *42. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at *43. 
135 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *42. 
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ganizing activities were protected under the RLA and whether 
Hawaiian had violated the RLA by: 1) accessing Konop's web-
site, 2) disclosing its content to an opposing union faction, and 
3) threatening to file suit against Konop.136 
C. RETALIATION CLAIM 
Konop claimed that his subpoenas for corroborating wit-
nesses were improperly quashed, which caused the district 
court to enter summary judgment against him in his claim 
that Hawaiian had violated the RLA when it placed him on 
sick leave in retaliation for the content of his website.137 "A lit-
igant whose subpoenas have been improperly quashed must 
... show prejudice."138 While finding that a question exists 
over whether the district court's remarks in a pretrial hearing 
constituted an order to quash subpoenas, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Konop had failed to show that he had been 
prejudiced by any order quashing subpoenas.139 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
Any person or company which maintains a website not 
generally accessible to the public may benefit from this deci-
sion. Additionally, as the Ninth Circuit made no distinction 
between eavesdropping and accessing a web site under false 
pretenses, employers gaining unauthorized access to an em-
ployee's secure website in an attempt to interfere with or-
ganizing activities will violate both the RLA and the Wiretap 
Act. 140 An employee's unauthorized access to or disclosure of 
the content of an employer's secured website may also be con-
sidered Wiretap Act violations.14l 
The Ninth Circuit's requirements under the Wiretap and 
Stored Communications Acts are relatively minimal.142 To en-
136 See id. at *42-43. 
137 See id. at *42. 
138 See id. at *43. See also Casino Foods Corp. v. Kraftco Corp., 546 F.2d 301, 302 
(9th Cir. 1976). 
139 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *43-44. 
140 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36. 
141 See Judy Greenwald, Lawyer's watching the airline case, Court expands wire-
tap law, Bus. Ins. at http://www.businessinsurance.com/archives/ (January 2001). 
142 See id. 
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sure protection from unlawful interception or access of content 
on a secure website, web hosts should adhere to the following 
guidelines: 1) limit the number and/or scope of intended 
users,143 2) require user names and passwords,144 3) require 
that all viewers accept the terms and conditions of use for the 
website,145 4) the terms of use must include a non-disclosure 
agreement. 146 
143 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *2l. 
144 See id. 
146 See id. 
146 See id. 
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